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Abstract
Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize agents to truthfully report their signals even in the
absence of verification by comparing agents’ reports with those of their peers. In the detail-
free multi-task setting, agents are asked to respond to multiple independent and identically
distributed tasks, and the mechanism does not know the prior distribution of agents’ signals.
The goal is to provide an -strongly truthful mechanism where truth-telling rewards agents
“strictly” more than any other strategy profile (with  additive error) even for heterogeneous
agents, and to do so while requiring as few tasks as possible.
We design a family of mechanisms with a scoring function that maps a pair of reports to
a score. The mechanism is strongly truthful if the scoring function is “prior ideal.” Moreover,
the mechanism is -strongly truthful as long as the scoring function used is sufficiently close
to the ideal scoring function. This reduces the above mechanism design problem to a learning
problem— specifically learning an ideal scoring function. Because learning the prior distribution
is sufficient (but not necessary) to learn the scoring function, we can apply standard learning
theory techniques that leverage side information about the prior (e.g., that it is close to some
parametric model). Furthermore, we derive a variational representation of an ideal scoring
function and reduce the learning problem into an empirical risk minimization.
We leverage this reduction to obtain very general results for peer prediction in the multi-task
setting. Specifically,
Sample Complexity We show how to derive good bounds on the number of tasks required
for different types of priors–in some cases exponentially improving previous results. In
particular, we can upper bound the required number of tasks for parametric models with
bounded learning complexity. Furthermore, our reduction applies to myriad continuous
signal space settings. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first peer-prediction mech-
anism on continuous signals designed for the multi-tasks setting.
Connection to Machine Learning We show how to turn a soft-predictor of an agent’s sig-
nals (given the other agents’ signals) into a mechanism. This allows the practical use of
machine learning algorithms that give good results even when many agents provide noisy
information.
Stronger Properties Our mechanisms apply to any stochastically relevant prior rather than
the more restrictive settings of previous mechanisms. In the finite setting, we obtain -
strongly truthful mechanisms, whereas prior work only achieves a weaker notion of truth-
fulness (informed truthfulness) [28, 1].
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1 Introduction
Peer prediction is the problem of information elicitation without verification. Peer prediction
mechanisms exploit the interdependence in agents’ signals to incentive agents to report their private
signal truthfully even when the reports cannot be directly verified. In the multi-task setting [5],
each agent is asked to respond to multiple, independent tasks. For example:
Example (Commute time). We can collect data from drivers to estimate the commute time of a
certain route. Each driver’s daily commute time might be modeled in the following way: each day,
the route has an expected time generated from a Gaussian distribution, and each driver’s commute
time is the expected time perturbed by independently distributed Gaussian noise.
Peer prediction from strategic agents has been attracting a surge of interest in economics and
computer science. Several previous works [1, 15, 19] can be understood as using particular learning
algorithms to learn nice payment functions that capture the interdependence in agents’ reports.
In this paper, we decouple these two components: mechanism design and learning algorithms.
This framework provides a clean black-box reduction from learning algorithms to peer prediction
mechanism.
One advantage of our framework is that we can use results from machine learning about com-
plexity of learning parameters of priors to obtain bounds on the sample complexity (number of
tasks required) of our mechanism. For instance, using our reduction, we can easily exponentially
improve the required number of tasks in the previous work [28].
Two features of our mechanisms enable us to work in more complicated settings. First, our
mechanisms use mutual information to pay agents. This allows us to use aggregation algorithms
and pay an agent the mutual information between her reports and the aggregated outcome of the
other agents. For example, suppose the agents’ report’s average quality is low, and a large fraction
of agents report random noise. In that case, we can use aggregation to enhance the signal to noise
ratio and provide a robust incentive to strategic workers. The second feature of our mechanisms is
a variational formulation, which ensures one-sided error such that we can only underestimate the
mutual information but not overestimate it. This allows us to measure different scoring functions’
accuracy agnostically. Thus, we can use deep learners or other rich enough functions to learn a
good payment in practice.
In addition to the above contributions, we also improve previous work in two axes: the truth-
fulness guarantee and the prior assumption.
The truthful guarantee explains how good the truth-telling strategy is in the mechanism (for-
mally defined in Sect.2.1). Is the truth-telling always the best response regardless of other’s strat-
egy (dominantly truthful)? Or truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and agents get strictly
higher payment than any other non-permutation equilibrium (strongly truthful) where a permuta-
tion equilibrium is one where agents report a permutation of the signals. A slightly weaker property
is informed truthful where no strategy profile pays strictly more than truth-telling, and truth-telling
pays more than any uninformative equilibrium. Our pairing mechanisms is dominantly truthful if
the number of tasks is infinite, and approximately strongly truthful when the number of tasks is
finite.
Previous peer prediction mechanisms make ad hoc assumptions on agents’ private signals (pos-
itively correlated [5], fine-grained [15], strictly correlated [11], or latent variable models [19]) which
are discussed in Sect. 2.2. Moreover, all the above mechanisms can only work when agents’ signals
are in a finite space. Under these assumptions, a question that bears asking is how generic their
truthful guarantee is. At one extreme, if agents’ private signal is always from a single known dis-
tribution, it is trivial to design a strongly truthful mechanism. Therefore, another axis to measure
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a peer prediction mechanism’s performance is its prior assumption, which tells how general agents’
prior can be.
There are two motivations to understand how general agents’ prior can be. First, in practice, we
need a peer prediction mechanism that works for continuous signals e.g., the above Commute time
example, but the previous mechanisms cannot.1 Second, a mechanism’s prior assumption often
reveals why the mechanism works. Thus, improving prior assumptions can push our theoretical
understanding of peer prediction mechanisms. It is well-known that to have the truth-telling
strategy profile as a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium, one necessary condition is that agents’
signals need to be stochastic relevant (Definition 2.2) [33]. However, when is stochastic relevance a
sufficient condition? In this paper, we show stochastic relevance is also a sufficient condition in the
multi-tasks setting. Our pairing mechanisms achieve approximately-strongly truthful as long as the
prior is stochastic relevant. In particular, the space of agents’ signals can be countably infinite or
even continuous. To the authors’ knowledge, our mechanism is the first that works on the maximal
possible prior structures in the multi-task setting.
Besides the above properties, we also require our mechanisms 1) are minimal which only elicit
the agents’ signals and no additional information; 2) are detail-free which do not require foreknowl-
edge of the prior; and 3) have low sample number, where each agent only needs to answer a few
questions for the mechanism to achieve approximately strong truthfulness. (Definition 2.1).
Our Techniques: Prior work [15] has shown that paying agents according to the Φ mutual infor-
mation (a generalization of the Shannon mutual information) between their signals is a good idea.
This is because, if agents try to strategically manipulate their signals, the Φ mutual information
can only decrease. However, a key open question is how to compute the mutual information while
having access to only a few signals for each agent. Moreover, the computation needs to be done in
a way that maintains the incentive guarantees of the mechanism.
We solve this issue. First, we convert the mechanism design problem into an optimization
problem (Theorem 6.1). The Φ mutual information of a pair of random variables can be defined
as the Φ divergence between two distributions: the joint distribution and the product of marginal
distributions. The Φ divergence is just a measure of distance between the two distributions and
contains the KL-divergence as a special case. The problem of computing the Φ divergence, using
variational representation as a bridge, can be changed into the optimization problem of finding
the best “distinguisher” between these two distributions. We call such a distinguisher a scoring
function. The optimal scoring function (distinguisher) can differentiate the two distributions with
a score equal to the Φ divergence, whereas any other scoring function (distinguisher) yields a lower
score. Thus, once one has this optimal scoring function, estimating the Φ divergence (and hence
Φ mutual information) is easy–just compute its score. In this paper we call the optimal scoring
function for a particular prior P , the (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function which can be easily computed
when the prior P is known.
Our mechanism will reward agents according to some scoring function. Importantly, agents’
ex-ante payments under prior P are maximized when both the distinguisher used is the (P,Φ)-ideal
scoring function, and the agents are truth-telling. Consequently, if we already have the (P,Φ)-ideal
scoring function, the mechanism incentivizes truthful reporting. Furthermore, agents are willing to
help the mechanism to learn the (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function rather than to trick it into using a
suboptimal scoring function.
Compared with Kong and Schoenebeck [15], our variational characterization provides a better
truthfulness guarantee when the number of tasks is finite. We can uniformly upper bound the
1Discretization approach is not practical in most situations [17].
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ex-ante payments under any non-truthful strategy profile (Definition 2.1) even when the learning
algorithm cannot estimate the ideal scoring functions under those non-truthful strategies. This
property is vital for continuous signal spaces where agents may adversarially adopt the worst
possible strategy profiles to compromise the learning algorithm.
The above observations transform the problem from designing a mechanism to simply learning
the (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function given samples from a prior. We provide two algorithms to learn
the scoring function. The first one is a generative approach which estimates the whole density
function of the prior and computes a scoring function from it. In a discriminative approach, we
formulate the estimation of the ideal scoring function as a convex optimization problem, empirical
risk minimization [22], and estimate the scoring function directly. This latter approach allows us
to use state-of-art convex optimization solvers to estimate good scoring functions.
Our Contributions: In this paper, we leverage the above insights to design a Φ-pairing mecha-
nism that is minimal and detail-free for heterogeneous agents. In particular:
Sample Complexity We show how to derive good bounds on the number of tasks required for
different types of priors–in some cases exponentially improving previous results. In particu-
lar, we can upper bound the required number of tasks for parametric models with bounded
learning complexity (as measured by a continuous analog of the VC dimension). Further-
more, our reduction applies to myriad continuous signal space settings. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first peer-prediction mechanism on continuous signals designed for the
multi-question setting.
Connection to Machine Learning We show how to turn a soft-predictor of an agent’s signals
(given the other agents’ signals) into a mechanism. This allows the practical use of machine
learning algorithms that give good results even when many agents provide noisy information.
Stronger Properties Our mechanisms apply to any stochastically relevant prior rather than the
more restrictive settings of previous mechanisms. In the finite setting, we obtain -strongly
truthful mechanisms, whereas prior work only achieves a weaker notion of truthfulness (in-
formed truthfulness) [28, 1].
D&G [5] CA [28, 1] Φ-MIM [15] DMI [11] Φ-pairing
mechanism
Signal space binary finite finite finite continuous
Prior
Assumptions
positive
correlated
stochastic
relevant
fine
-grained
strictly
correlated
stochastic
relevant
Truthful X X X X X
Informed-truthful X X X X X
Strongly truthful X X(fine-grained) X X
Detail-free X X X X X
Samples O(n) ∞ O(|Ω|2) O(log n)
In the above table, Ω is the signal space required to be shared by all agents.
1.1 Related Work
Multi-task setting In the multi-task setting, Dasgupta and Ghosh [5] propose a strongly truthful
mechanism when the signal space is binary and every pair of agents’ signals are assumed to be
positively correlated. Both Kong and Schoenebeck [15] and Shnayder et al. [28] independently
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generalize Dasgupta and Ghosh [5] to discrete signal spaces, though in different manners illustrated
as follows.
Kong and Schoenebeck [15] present the Φ-mutual information mechanism , a multi-task
peer prediction mechanism for the finite signal space setting with arbitrary interdependence between
signals. Unfortunately, the sample number is infinite. They show that their mechanism is strongly
truthful as long as the prior is “fine-grained” (it is truthful in any event). A prior is fine-grained
if, roughly speaking, no two signals can be interpreted as different names for the same signal.
To define their mechanism they introduce the notion of Φ-mutual information (of which Shannon
mutual information is a special case) where Φ is any convex function. Their mechanism pays each
agent the Φ-mutual information between her reports and the reports of another randomly chosen
agent. Strategic behavior is shown to not increase Φ-mutual information by a generalized version
of the data processing inequality. Unfortunately, their analysis requires infinite sample number to
measure this Φ-mutual information and does not handle errors in estimation.
Shnayder et al. [28] introduce the Correlated Agreement (CA) mechanism which also
generalizes Dasgupta and Ghosh [5] to any finite signal space. On the one hand, the CA mechanism
can assume the knowledge of the “signal structure” (which tells which signals are positively and
negatively correlated). In this case they can provide a mechanism that is truthful with sample
number of two.2 On the other hand, when agents are homogeneous the CA mechanism can learn
the signal structure, albeit with some chance of error, if it has sample number O(n). The CA
mechanism is shown to be robust to this error, and is -truthful. In both cases the CA mechanism
is actually -informed truthful (a slightly weaker notion than strongly truthful). Agarwal et al. [1]
extend the above work of Shnayder et al. [28] to a particular setting of heterogeneous agents where
agents are (close to) one of a fixed number of types. They again establish a O(n) sample number
in this new setting.
Note that in the above works, a new robustness (error) analysis is required for each different
setting of interdependence between signals. Interestingly, the CA mechanism can be viewed as
a special case of the aforementioned Φ-mutual information mechanism using the total variation
distance mutual information (i.e., Φ(a) = |a − 1|/2). However, instead of directly computing this
mutual information, the CA mechanism obtains a consistent estimator of it [15]. Similarly, in the
special case that our mechanism implements the total variation distance, we also recover the CA
mechanism. However, our analysis is entirely different.
Kong [11] shows an elegant way of obtaining strongly truthful mechanisms (DMI mechanism)
for the multitask setting. Our results are incommensurate with these results. In our results, the
sample complexity grows with the  in the desired -strongly truthful guarantee but is independent
of the number of signals. In Kong [11], there is an exact strongly truthful guarantee with sample
complexity grows in the size of the signal space. However, the prior structure needs to be strictly
correlated, which is a stronger assumption on stochastic relevance. We provide comparison at
Sect. 2.2. In particular, her mechanism requires all agents’ report space are all finite and have the
same size. This restricts applications of the aggregation algorithm mentioned in the introduction
and Sect. 8.
Single task setting In general, agents do not (necessarily) have multiple identical and inde-
pendent signals. Without this property, most of the mechanisms require knowledge of a common
prior (not detail-free) or for agents to report their whole posterior distribution of other’s signals
(not minimal). The later solution is especially difficult to apply to complicated signal spaces (e.g.
asking agents to report their probability density function of others’ continuous signals).
2The original paper shows it requires 3, but it actually only needs 2 tasks.
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Miller et al. [20] introduce the peer prediction mechanism which is the first mechanism that
has truth-telling as a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium and does not need verification. However,
their mechanism requires the full knowledge of the common prior and there exist some equilibria
that are paid more than truth-telling. In particular, the oblivious equilibrium pays strictly more
than truth-telling. Kong et al. [16] modify the original peer prediction mechanism such that truth-
telling pays strictly better than any other equilibrium but still requires the full knowledge of the
common prior. Prelec [23] designs the first detail-free peer prediction mechanism—Bayesian truth
serum (BTS) in the one quesetion setting. Several other works study the one-question setting of
BTS [24, 25, 31, 12]. For continuous signals, Radanovic and Faltings [25] apply a discretization
approach and use a new payment method, but that is also non-minimal. Goel and Faltings [10]
work on a mixture of normal distributions with an infinite number of agents.
Miscellany Liu and Chen [18] design a peer prediction mechanism where each agents’ responses
are not compared to another agents’, but rather the output of a machine learning classifier that
learns from all the other agents’ responses. Liu and Chen [19] design a non-minimal approximate
dominant strategy mechanism that uses surrogate loss functions as tools to correct for the mistakes
in agents’ reports. Kong and Schoenebeck [14] studies the related goal for forecast elicitation, and
like the present work uses Fenchel’s duality to reward truth-telling (though in a different manner).
One interesting, but orthogonal, line of work looks at “cheap” signals, where agents can coordi-
nate on less useful information. For example, instead of grading an assignment based on correctness,
a grader could only spot check the grammar. Gao et al. [9] introduces the issue, while Kong and
Schoenebeck [13] shows a partial solution using conditional mutual information.
The recent book Faltings and Radanovic [7] surveys additional results from this area.
1.2 Structure of Paper
Sect. 2 introduces some basic notions in this paper. In particular, Sect. 2.2 defines scoring functions,
which will play an important role in this paper.
At the beginning of Sect. 3, we define a central component of our Φ-pairing mechanism, Mech-
anism 1, which takes agents’ report and a scoring function K as input. In Sect. 4, we consider the
full information setting. We show, in the Mechanism 1 with an ideal scoring function, agents are
incentivized to report their signals truthfully. In Sect. 5, we prove Theorem 4.1, and main technical
lemmas.
In Sect. 6, we define a notion of approximation of an ideal scoring function and introduce our
framework that reduces the mechanism problem for information elicitation to a learning problem
for an ideal scoring function (Theorem 6.1).
In Sect. 7, we focus on the learning problem introduced in Sect. 6. We first show two sufficient
conditions for approximating an ideal scoring function in Sect. 7.1. Then, we present two algorithms
to derive approximately ideal scoring functions from agents’ reports in Sect. 7.2. Additionally, in
Sect. 7.3, we provide an obstacle to designing peer prediction mechanisms based on this divergence
based method.
In Sect. 8, we generalize Mechanism 1 to more than two agents. We show how machine learning
techniques can be naturally integrated with our mechanism.
Finally, in Appendix E we compare our mechanisms with Shnayder et al. [28] and Kong and
Schoenebeck [15].
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2 Preliminaries
We use (Ω,F , µ) to denote a measure space where F is a σ-algebra on the outcome space Ω and µ is
a measure. Let ∆Ω denote the set of distributions of over (Ω,F),3 and P as a subset of distributions
in ∆Ω. Given a distribution P , we also use P to denote the density function where P (ω) is the
probability density of outcome ω ∈ Ω. We use uppercase for a random object X and lowercase for
the outcome x. In this paper we consider Φ to be a convex continuous function and use dom(Φ) to
denote its domain.
2.1 Mechanism Design for Information Elicitation
For simplicity we first consider two agents, Alice and Bob, who work on a set of m tasks denoted
as [m]. For each task s ∈ [m], Alice receives a signal xs in X and Bob a signal ys in Y. We use
(X,Y) ∈ (X × Y)m to denote the signal profile of Alice and Bob which is generated from a prior
distribution P.4 In this paper, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (A priori similar tasks [5]). P is a prior, and each task is identically and indepen-
dently (i.i.d.) generated: there exists a distribution PX,Y over X×Y such that P = PmX,Y , Moreover,
we assume the marginal distributions have full supports, PX(x) > 0 and PY (y) > 0 for all x ∈ X
and y ∈ Y.
Given a report profile of Alice, xˆ ∈ Xm and Bob, yˆ ∈ Ym, an information elicitation mechanism
M = (MA,MB) with m tasks pays MA(xˆ, yˆ) ∈ R to Alice, and MB(xˆ, yˆ) ∈ R to Bob. In the rest
of the paper we often only define notions for Alice, and define Bob’s in the symmetric way.
Besides Assumption 1, we assume their strategies are uniform and independent across different
tasks which is also made in previous work [5, 28, 15]. Formally, the strategy of Alice is a random
function θA : X → ∆X where θA(x, xˆ) is the probability that Alice reports xˆ conditioning on
her private information x. That is, each report only depends on the corresponding signal. For
instance, given Alice receiving x ∈ Xm the probability that Alice reports xˆ ∈ Xm is Pr[Xˆ = xˆ] =∏
s∈[m] θA(xs, xˆs). We call θ = (θA, θB) a the strategy profile. The ex-ante payment to Alice under
a strategy profile θ and a prior P in mechanism M is
uA(θ;P,M) , E
(X,Y)
[
E
(Xˆ,Yˆ)
[
E
M
[MA(xˆ, yˆ)]
]
| (x,y)
]
where we use a semicolon to separate the variable, θ, and parameters P and M. Note that a
strategy profile θ can be seen as a Markov operator on probability measures on the signal space
X × Y, and Alice and Bob’s reports, θ ◦ P , is also a distribution on the signal space X × Y.
In the literature of information elicitation, there are three important classes of strategies. We
use τ to denote the truth-telling strategy profile where both agents’ reports are equal to their
private signals with probability 1, e.g., Alice’s strategy is τA(x, xˆ) = I[x = xˆ]. A strategy profile
is a permutation strategy profile if both agents’ strategy are a (deterministic) permutation, a
bijection between signals and reports. Finally, a strategy profile is oblivious or uninformed if even
one of the agents’ strategies does not depend on their signal: that is for Alice θA(x, xˆ) = θA(x
′, xˆ)
for all x, x′, and xˆ in X . Note that the set of permutation strategy profiles includes the truth-telling
strategy profile τ but does not include any oblivious strategy profiles.
3We assume these distribution has a density function with respect to the µ, P  µ for all P ∈ ∆Ω. The
distributions in ∆Ω depend on F and µ, but we omit it to simplify the notation. The density is defined as the
RadonNikodym derivative dP
dµ
which exists because P is dominated by µ.
4The prior can be subjective, and Alice’s and Bob’s can be difference. Here we analyzes the process in Alice’s
perspective.
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Truthful Guarantees We now define some truthfulness guarantees for our mechanism M that
differ in how unique the high payoff of truth-telling strategy profile is:
Truthful: the truth-telling strategy profile τ is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, and has the highest
payment to both Alice and Bob.
Informed-truthful [28]: Truthful and also for each agent τ is strictly better than any oblivi-
ous strategy profiles. For any oblivious strategy profile θ, uA(τ ;P,M) > uA(θ;P,M) and
uB(τ ;P,M) > uB(θ;P,M).
Strongly truthful [28, 15]: Truthful and also for each agent τ is strictly better than all non-
permutation strategy profiles. For any non-permutation strategy profile θ, uA(τ ;P,M) >
uA(θ;P,M) and uB(τ ;P,M) > uB(θ;P,M).
Dominant truthful: Each agent report truthfully leads to higher expected payoff than other
strategies, regardless of other agent’s reporting strategies. For any strategy profile θ, we have
uA(τ ;P,M) > uA(θ;P,M) and uB(τ ;P,M) > uB(θ;P,M).
We can also call a general mapping truthful, informed-truthful, strongly truthful, dominant truthful
when it satisfy the corresponding property.
In this work, we consider an approximate version of above statements with low sample number.
For example, given  > 0, a mechanism M with m() tasks (the sample number)5 is -strongly
truthful with m() tasks if there exists a mapping from strategy profiles to ex-ante payments such
that 1) this mapping is strongly truthful; 2) for all  the ex-ante payments of our mechanism with
m() tasks is within  of this mapping.
Now we define the sample number for approximately truthfulness guarantees.
Definition 2.1. Given a family of joint signal distributions P and a function S : R>0 → N we
say a mechanism M is -strongly truthful on P with S() number of tasks, if there exists
a strongly truthful mapping F = (FA, FB) from joint signal distributions and strategy profiles to
payments such that for all  > 0 and m ≥ S()
1. the ex-ante payment under the truth-telling strategy profile inM with m number of tasks is
within  additive error from F : for all P ∈ P,
uA(τ ;P,M) ≥ FA(τ , P )− ;
2. and the ex-ante payment under any strategy profile θ inM with m number of tasks is bounded
above by F : for all P ∈ P, and θ
uA(θ;P,M) ≤ FA(θ, P ).
And the inequality also holds for Bob’s ex-ante payment. Furthermore, we sayM is (δ, )-strongly
truthful on P with S(δ, ) if the above conditions holds with probability 1 − δ for all δ ∈ (0, 1)
and  > 0.
Additionally, we sayM is -informal-truthful (-truthful) with S() number of tasks if it is
 close to an inform-truthful (truthful) mapping.
Note that our notion of -truthfulness guarantee is quite strong. In particular, the second item
requires for any strategy profile θ, the ex-ante payment is upper bounded by a strongly truthful
(inform-truthful, truthful) mapping.
5Here mechanism which can take different length of report m. Or we can consider a family of mechanisms (Mm)
parameterized by the sample number (the number of tasks) m.
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2.2 Prior Assumptions
There are two axes to compare these peer prediction mechanism: truthful guarantee and prior
assumption. Truthful guarantee asks how good the truth-telling strategy is. Prior assumption
addresses how general these mechanisms are. We first introduce the weakest possible notion of
interdependence that we used in our paper. Then we survey other notions proposed in previous
works. Finally, we provide concrete examples to show the distinction between those notions of
interdependence.
Definition 2.2 (Stochastic Relevant [28]). We call PX,Y stochastic relevant if for any two distinct
signals x, x′ ∈ X
PX,Y [Y | X = x] 6= PX,Y [Y | X = x′].
That is, Alice’s posteriors on Bob’s signals are different when Alice receives signal x or x′. And
symmetrically, the same holds for Bob’s posterior on Alice’s signals.
Stochastic relevancy is the weakest assumption we can hope for designing peer prediction mech-
anisms. Proposition 2.3 shows that if agent’s signal are not stochastic relevant an agent can always
misreport regardless other agents’ reports even if the mechanism knows the information structure.
Proposition 2.3 (Elicitability [33]). If the prior PX,Y is not stochastic relevant, there is no mech-
anism that has truth-telling as a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Besides the above notion, previous peer prediction mechanisms make ad hoc assumptions on
agents’ private signals.
Kong and Schoenebeck [15] studies fine-grained joint distributions. A joint distribution PX,Y
is fine-grained if for any distinct pairs of signals (x, y) and (x′, y′)
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
6= PX,Y (x
′, y′)
PX(x′)PY (y′)
.
Kong [11] considers strictly correlated distributions. A joint distribution P on a finite space X 2 is
strictly correlated if the determinant of distribution P ∈ R|X |×|X | is nonzero. Those two notions
are both stronger than stochastic relevance, and the following example to show this.
Example. Suppose Alice and Bob review papers and grade with a scale from one to three (reject,
neutral, accept) {1, 2, 3}. The paper can be either good or bad with uniform probability. If the
paper is good, Alice’s grade X ∈ {1, 2, 3} is generate from distribution Γ1 = [0.2, 0.2, 0.6]>. If the
paper is bad, X is sampled from distribution Γ0 = [0.6, 0.2, 0.2]
>. The distribution of Bob’s signal
Y on the paper is sampled identically and independently conditional on the state of the paper.
Thus, PX,Y (x, y) = 0.5Γ1,xΓ1,y + 0.5Γ0,xΓ0,y, and the joint distribution of X and Y is
PX,Y = 0.5Γ
>
1 Γ1 + 0.5Γ
>
0 Γ0 =
0.20 0.08 0.120.08 0.04 0.08
0.12 0.08 0.20
 (1)
where the first index is on X and the second index is on Y .
Now we show this simple prior is stochastic relevant but not fine-grained nor strictly correlated.
Therefore those mechanisms do not have provable truthful guarantee on this simple prior.
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1. The prior PX,Y in Eqn.(1) is stochastic relevant, because Pr[Y | X] =
0.5 0.2 0.30.4 0.2 0.4
0.3 0.2 0.5
 where
each row is distinct and Pr[Y | X] also has this property due to symmetry.
2. P is not fine-grain, because
(
PX,Y (x,y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
x,y∈X×Y
=
1.25 1.00 0.751.00 1.00 1.00
0.75 1.00 1.25
 where PX,Y (1,0)PX(1)PY (0) =
PX,Y (0,1)
PX(0)PY (1)
.
3. Finally, PX,Y is not strictly correlated, because det(PX,Y ) = 0.
2.3 Convex Analysis and Φ-divergence
Informally, Φ-divergences quantify the difference between a pair of distributions over a common
measurable space.
Definition 2.4 (Φ-divergence [3, 21, 2]). Let Φ : [0,∞)→ R be a convex function with Φ(1) = 0.
Let P and Q be two probability distributions on a common measurable space (Ω,F). The Φ-
divergence of Q from P where P  Q6 is defined as DΦ(P‖Q) , EQ [Φ (P/Q)] .7
We can use these divergences to measure how interdependent between two random variables X
and Y . Formally, Let PX,Y be a distribution over (x, y) ∈ X × Y, and PX and PY be marginal
distributions of X and Y respectively. We set PXPY be the tensor product between PX and PY such
that PXPY (x, y) = PX(x)PY (y). We call DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ) the Φ-mutual information between
X and Y .
Given a joint distribution PX,Y , let joint to marginal product ratio at (x, y) on PX,Y be
JPP (x, y) :=
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
which is ratio between joint probability divided by the product of the probabilities at (x, y). We
will omit subscript P when there is not ambiguity. This ratio appears in several literature. For
instance, it’s called observed to expected ratio in life sciences literature, or lift in data mining for
binary random variable. Additionally, log JP(x, y) is called point-wise mutual information. Finally,
note that Φ mutual information is the average of joint to marginal product ratio applied to Φ.
Now, we introduce some basic notions in convex analysis [27]. Let Φ : [0,+∞)→ R be a convex
function. The convex conjugate Φ∗ of Φ is defined as: Φ∗(b) = supa∈dom(Φ){ab− Φ(a)}. Moreover
Φ = Φ∗∗ if Φ is continuous.
By Young-Fenchel inequality [8], we can rewrite the Φ-divergence of Q from P in a variational
form. This formulation is important to understand our mechanisms.
Theorem 2.5 (Variational representation [22, 32]).
DΦ(P‖Q) = sup
k:Ω→dom(Φ∗)
{
E
ω∼P
[k(ω)]− E
ω∼Q
[Φ∗(k(ω))]
}
, 8
6P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q: for any measurable set A ∈ F , Q(A) = 0⇒ P (A) = 0.
7P/Q is the Radon-Nikodym derivative between measures P and Q, and it is equal to the ratio of density function.
8The sup is taken over k with finite Eω∼P [k(ω)] and Eω∼Q[Φ∗(k(ω))].
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and the equality holds DΦ(P‖Q) = Eω∼P [k(ω)] − Eω∼Q[Φ∗(k(ω))] if and only if k ∈ ∂Φ (P/Q)
almost everywhere on Q.9
For completeness, we provide a proof for Theorem 2.5 and some examples for Φ-divergence in
Appendix A.1.
2.4 Scoring Function
Our constructions and analysis will make heavy use of the following functionals— scoring functions.
Definition 2.6 (Scoring function). A scoring function K : X × Y → R is a functional (real-
valued function) that maps from a pair of reports to a real value. Given a convex function Φ, a
scoring function K?P,Φ is a (PX,Y ,Φ)-ideal scoring function if
K?P,Φ(x, y) ∈ ∂Φ
(
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
= ∂Φ(JPP (x, y)). (2)
We will use P and PX,Y interchangeably later, and say K
? is ideal without specifying P and Φ
when it’s clear.
A (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function is the joint to marginal product ratio applied to ∂Φ which is
a monotone increasing function if Φ is differentiable. joint to marginal product ratio encodes the
signal structure of PX,Y which measure how interdependent x and y is. Alternatively, the scoring
function serves as a “distinguisher” which tries to decide whether a pair of reports came from the
joint distribution or the product of the marginal distributions.
Furthermore, the ideal scoring function can be easily computed from the density function PX,Y .
We give a example that will serve as a running example in this paper.
Example (Joint Gaussian Signals). On each day s, a certain route has a expected driving time
µs drawn from Gaussian distribution N (m0, σ2) i.i.d., 10 and Alice receives a driving time x from
N (µs, τ2) and Bob receives y from N (µs, τ2) independently conditioned on µs. Therefore, PX,Y is
pair of correlated Gaussians with mean (m0,m0) and covariance
(
σ2 + τ2 σ2
σ2 σ2 + τ2
)
. LetG(x, y) ,
(x −m0, y −m0)
(
σ2 + τ2 −σ2
−σ2 σ2 + τ2
)(
x−m0
y −m0
)
be a quadratic form on x and y. Then the joint
to marginal product ratio is
JP(x, y) =
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
=
√
(σ2 + τ2)2
2σ2τ2 + τ4
exp
( −1
2(2σ2τ2 + τ4)
G(x, y)
)
.
If Φ(a) = 12 |a− 1|, and constant R ,
(
σ2τ2 + τ4
)
log
(
(σ2+τ2)2
2σ2τ2+τ4
)
, an ideal scoring function is
K?P,Φ(x, y) =
{
1
2 if G(x, y) < R
−12 if G(x, y) ≥ R
which can be represented by an ellipse Γ. The scoring function is 1/2 if the input is in the ellipse
and −1/2 otherwise. (cf. Figure 1)
9∂Φ is the subgradient of Φ, and the formal definition can be found in [27]. Here we only use the equality condition
when Ω is finite.
10N (m0, σ2) denotes the Gaussian distribution with mean m0 and covariance matrix (or variance) σ2
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If Φ(a) = a log a, the Φ-ideal scoring function is
K?P,Φ(x, y) = −
1
2(2σ2τ2 + τ4)
G(x, y) + 1 +
1
2
log
(
(σ2 + τ2)2
2σ2τ2 + τ4
)
which is a quadratic function on x and y. (cf. Figure 1)
PX,Y probability density function K
?
P,Φ with Φ(a) = |a− 1| K?P,Φ with Φ(a) = a log a
Figure 1: The top row uses σ = 1 and τ = 2, and the bottom row uses σ = 2 and τ = 1. Note that
if Alice’s and Bob’s signals are more correlated σ  τ , Γ is more skew
2.5 Functional Complexity
In thi section, we provide some standard notions to characterize the complexity of learning func-
tionals which are standard [29, 30], and discuss more in Sect. A.2. We will use these notions to
characterize the complexity of learning an ideal scoring function.
Let K is a pre-specified class of functionals k : X × Y → R. Given k ∈ K, L > 0, and a
distribution PX,Y , we define the Bernstein norm as
ρ2L(k;P ) , 2L2 E
P
[exp (|k|/L)− 1− |k|/L], and ρL(K;P ) , sup
k∈K
ρL(k, P ).
LetN[],L(δ,K, P ) be the smallest value of n for which there exists n pairs of functions {(kLj , kUj )} such
that 1) ρL(k
U
j − kLj ;P ) ≤ δ for all j and 2) for all k ∈ K there is a j, kLj (x, y) ≤ k(x, y) ≤ kUj (x, y)
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y. Then
H[],L(δ,K, P ) , logN[],L(δ,K, P )
is called the generalized entropy with bracketing. We further define the entropy integral as J[],L(R,K, P ) ,∫ R
0
√
H[],L(u,K, P )du.
Our results will show that constant number of questions suffice as long as the ideal scoring
functions is in some bounded complexity space K where J[],L(R,K, P ) and ρL(K;P ) are bounded.
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3 Φ-Divergence Pairing Mechanisms
In this section, we first define a class of multi-task peer-prediction mechanisms MΦ,K Alice and
Bob who work on all m ≥ 2 tasks. The mechanism is parametrized by a convex function Φ and a
scoring function K (Definition 2.6). Then we briefly discuss how to obtain a good scoring function,
and develop algorithms for estimating good scoring function.
The process of this mechanism is quite simple. Given a scoring function K and Φ, we arbitrarily
choose one task b, and two distinct tasks p and q from m ≥ 2 tasks. Alice gets paid by Eqn. (3) the
scoring function on her and Bob’s reports on task b minus the Φ∗ applied to the scoring function
on her report on p and Bob’s report on q. In this way, agents are paid by a scoring function on a
correlated task minus a regularized scoring function on two uncorrelated tasks.
Mechanism 1 Φ-divergence pairing mechanism with a scoring function K for two agents, MΦ,K
Input: A report profile (xˆ, yˆ) where both Alice and Bob submit report for all m ≥ 2 tasks.
Parameters: A convex function Φ : [0,∞) → R, its conjugate Φ∗, and a scoring function K :
X × Y → dom(Φ∗) ⊆ R.
1: For Alice, arbitrarily pick three tasks b, p and q where p and q are distinct. We call b the bonus
task, p the penalty task to Alice, and q the penalty task to Bob.
2: Based on Alice’s reports on b and p (xˆb and xˆp) and Bob’s reports on b and q (yˆb and yˆq), the
payment to Alice is
MΦ,KA (xˆ, yˆ) , K (xˆb, yˆb)− Φ∗ (K (xˆp, yˆq)) . (3)
3: The payment of Bob is defined similarly.
To simplify the notion, we use uA or uA(θ, P,K) to denote the ex-ante payment to Alice under
a strategy profile θ and a joint signal distribution P in pairing mechanism with a scoring function
K.
In general, the truthfulness guarantees of Mechanism 1 depends on the degeneracy of Alice’s
and Bob’s signal distribution P and convex function Φ. In this paper, we consider three different
conditions which will be used in the statement of our results.
Assumption 2. In this paper, we consider the following four different settings.
1. no assumption;
2. PX,Y is stochastic relevant;
3. Besides the above conditions, X and Y are finite sets, Φ is strictly convex and differentiable,
and Φ∗ is strictly convex.
3.1 Obtaining a Good Scoring Function
The Φ-pairing mechanismMΦ,K is not stand-alone mechanism for information elicitation, because
it requires a scoring function K as a parameter. We will see shortly in Sect. 4 and 6, the truthfulness
guarantees of the pairing mechanism depends on the quality of the scoring function. In this paper,
we consider three different models for mechanism designers to estimate good scoring functions
which are discussed in the rest of the sections:
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Direct access of K?P,Φ In Sect. 4, we first consider the mechanism knows a (P,Φ)-ideal scoring
function K?P,Φ. Note that if the mechanism knows the prior P , it can compute the (P,Φ)-ideal
scoring function, but the converse is not necessarily true.
General reduction to a learning problem In Sect. 6, besides the reports from Alice and Bob,
mechanism may exploit Alice and Bob’s previous scoring function and other side information.
For example the joint distribution between Alice and Bob can be approximated by some para-
metric model, say joint Gaussian distributions. We introduce our framework (Mechanism 2)
that reduces the problem into a learning problem.
Estimation from samples Finally, in the multi-task setting, if Alice and Bob truthfully report
their signals, it is possible to estimate the (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function from those reports.
However, the mechanism needs to incentive them to be truthful. In Sect. 7, we propose two
learning methods to estimate good scoring functions. Combining them with our framework
(Mehcanism 2), we can have detail-free -strongly truthful mechanisms with high probability.
4 Pairing Mechanisms in the Known Prior Setting
If the the mechanismMΦ,K? has an (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function K? where P is the joint distribu-
tion to Alice’s and Bob’s signals, the mechanism has the following properties. We defer the proof
to Sect. 5.
Theorem 4.1. Let an integer m be greater than 2, a functional Φ be a continuous convex func-
tion with [0,∞) ⊆ dom(Φ), P with PX,Y be a common prior between Alice and Bob satisfying
Assumption 1. Let τ be the truth-telling strategy profile, and K? be a (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function.
The Φ-pairing mechanism with K?,MΦ,K? has the following properties: For any strategy profile
θ, 11
uA (θ, P,H) ≤ uA (τ , P,H) . (4)
Furthermore, under the four conditions in Assumption 2 respectively, the mechanism MΦ,K? is
1. truthful,
2. informed-truthful, or
3. strongly truthful.
In the following example, we show how Mechanism 1 with a (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function works,
and illustrate the difference between informed-truthful and strongly truthful.
Example (continued). On each day s, Alice and Bob learn their commute time (xs, ys) ∈ R2. We
want to use Mechanism 1 to collect those commute time, and we know PX,Y .
When Φ(a) = 12 |a− 1|, a (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function is K?(x, y) = I[G(x, y) > R]− 1/2 which
can be represented by an ellipse Γ. After Alice and Bob report their every day’s commute time
xˆ, yˆ, the mechanism arbitrarily pick a bonus day b, and two distinct penalty days p and q. Then it
pays Alice with 1 if their bonus day reports are in the ellipse Γ and their penalty days reports are
not in Γ. As seen in Fig. 1, Γ is skew in diagonal, so if Alice’s and Bob’s reports on the bonus day
are more correlated they can get more payment.
11There are some minor details when X and Y are not finite set. Here we require θ to have finite∫
H dθA dθBdPX,Y ,and
∫
Φ∗(H) dθA dθBdPXPY .
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However, if Alice receives an extremely large value (e.g. xs = 20) such that she knows the scoring
function K? is −1/2 for certain regardless of Bob’s report (cf. Figure 1), Alice can misreport her
signal (e.g. xˆs = 2 when xs ≥ 20) without changing her expected utility. Therefore the Φ-pairing
mechanism with Φ(a) = 12 |a − 1| is not strongly truthful. Additionally, truth-telling is not even a
strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
To prevent Alice from truncating signals, instead of Φ(a) = 12 |a− 1| we can take other strictly
convex Φ. For example if Φ(a) = a log a, the ideal scoring function is a quadratic function and
above-mentioned strategy cannot trivially hold. In Theorem 4.1 we prove this in the finite signal
spaces setting.
Remark 4.2. Although the Φ-pairing mechanism with a (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function has many
desirable properties shown in Theorem 4.1, such a mechanism is not detail-free. Furthermore, in the
detail-free setting where mechanisms only access Alice’s and Bob’s reports, it is impossible to have a
mechanism which has truth-telling strategy profile as the uniquely best equilibrium. Informally, in
the detail-free setting a mechanismM cannot distinguish between the following two situations: 1)
Alice and Bob’s signals joint distribution is P and their strategy profile is a permutation θ; 2) Alice
and Bob’s signals joint distribution is θ ◦ P and their strategy profile is the truth-telling strategy,
because their reports are generated from the same distribution θ ◦ P in both cases. Therefore,
uA(θ;P,M) = uA(τ ;θ ◦ P,M). (5)
Suppose the ex-ante payment under the truth-telling strategy profile and P is strictly higher than
the ex-ante payment under a permutation strategy profile θ. Then the ex-ante payment under
a permutation strategy profile θ−1 and the joint signal distribution θ ◦ P , uA(θ−1;θ ◦ P,M) =
uA(τ ;P,M) is strictly higher than the ex-ante payment under truth-telling strategy profile uA(τ ;θ◦
P,M) = uA(θ;P,M). This argument is trivially true when M is a Φ-pairing algorithm and the
scoring function is a function of Alice’s and Bob’s reports. For general detail-free mechanisms, the
reader may refer to Sect. 8 of Kong and Schoenebeck [15].
5 Main Technical Lemmas
To prove Theorem 4.1, we use the following lemmas which are also important in the rest of the
paper.
We first show the ex-ante payment under the truth-telling strategy profile in the Φ-pairing
mechanism with (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function is the Φ-mutual information between Alice’s and
Bob’s signals.
Lemma 5.1 (Truth-telling). If K? is a (PX,Y ,Φ)-ideal scoring function,
uA(τ , P,K
?) = DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ).
Moreover, if PX,Y is stochastic relevant, DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ) > 0.
Then we show any deviation from the truth-telling strategy profile or an ideal scoring function
cannot improve Alice (and Bob’s) ex-ante payment. The proof uses the variational representation
of Φ-divergence (Theorem 2.5).
Lemma 5.2 (Manipulation in strategies and scoring functions). For any strategy profile θ and
scoring function K,12
uA(θ, P,K) ≤ DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ).
12There are some minor details when X and Y are not finite set. Here we require K and θ to have finite ∫ K dPX,Y ,∫
Φ∗(K)d(PXPY ),
∫
K dθA dθBdPX,Y ,and
∫
Φ∗(K) dθA dθBdPXPY .
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Note that combining these two lemmas we have an even stronger result than inequality (4)
which is a key tool in this paper: For any scoring function K and strategy profile θ,
uA (θ,P,K) ≤ uA (τ ,P,K?) . (6)
Lemma 5.3 (Oblivious strategy). If θ is an oblivious strategy profile, for any scoring function K
uA(θ, P,K) ≤ 0.
Lemma 5.4. Moreover, given Conditions 3 in Assumption 2, the equality in (6) for Alice or Bob
occurs if and only if
1. θ = (piA, piB) which is a permutation strategy profile, and
2. For all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, K(piA(x), piB(y)) = Φ′ (JP(x, y)) = Φ′
(
PX,Y (x,y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
.
Informally, Lemma 5.4 shows if the pair of a strategy profile and a scoring function (θ,K) have
(6) equal only if there is a “conjugated” structure between the strategy and the scoring function.
The proof uses the pigeonhole principle on the finite signal spaces and shows if the equality holds
under a non permutation strategy profile, P is not stochastic relevant.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
With the above four lemmas, we are ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. There are four statements to show.
First, (4) is a direct result of (6). Furthermore, (4) proves that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, and has highest ex-ante payment to Alice.13 This shows the mechanism is truthful.
By Lemma 5.3, the ex-ante payment to Alice (and Bob) is non-positive. Combining this and
Lemma 5.1, we prove the Φ-pairing mechanism with (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function is inform-truthful
when P is stochastic relevant.
To show our mechanism is strongly truthful, under Condition 3 in Assumption 2, we use the
first part of Lemma 5.4. If the ex-ante payment under some strategy profile is equal to the ex-
ante payment under the truth-telling strategy profile, the strategy profile is a permutation strategy
profile.
6 The Pairing Mechanism in the Detail Free Settings
With Sect. 5, we can see that to achieve the truthfulness guarantees, it suffices to have a “good”
scoring function. That is if the ex-ante payment to Alice under the truth-telling strategy profile is
close to the Φ-mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s signals, by (6), the ex-ante payment
under an untruthful-strategy is less than the ex-ante payment under the truth-telling strategy
profile.
In Sect. 6.1 we formalize the notions of a good scoring function and of the accuracy of a learning
algorithm L for scoring functions. In Sect. 6.2, we state our main result, Theorem 6.1, which reduces
the mechanism design problem to a learning problem for an ideal scoring function, and provides
some intuition about the proof of the theorem.
13Note that without additional assumption the truth-telling is not a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This is
illustrated in the example in Sect. 4.
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6.1 Accuracy of Scoring Rules and Learning Algorithms
Now we define a good scoring function, and the accuracy of a learning algorithm L. Given Φ, a
prior PX,Y and  > 0, we say that a scoring function K is -ideal on (PX,Y ,Φ), if for Alice
uA(τ , P,K) ≥ uA(τ , P,K?P,Φ)−  = DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY )− , (7)
and the similar inequality holds for Bob. Additionally, For mL ∈ N, we say a learning algorithm for
scoring functions with mL samples, as a function from (xL,yL) ∈ (X ×Y)mL to a scoring function
K. Given P, a set of distributions on X ×Y, and a function SL : R×R→ N, we say such a learning
algorithm L is (δ, )-accurate on (P,Φ) with SL(δ, ) samples, if for all PX,Y ∈ P, δ ∈ (0, 1),
 > 0, and mL ≥ SL(δ, ):
Pr
(xL,yL)∼PmLX,Y
[uA(τ , P,L(xL,yL)) > DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY )− ] ≥ 1− δ.
That is given mL i.i.d. samples from PX,Y , the probability that the output, L(xL,yL), is -ideal on
(P,Φ) is greater than 1− δ. Note that we require the algorithm L approximates the ideal scoring
uniformly on all distributions in P.
6.2 Pairing Mechanism with Learning Algorithms
Now we replace a fixed scoring function with an accurate learning algorithm L in Mechanism 1.
Intuitively, in the detail-free setting, the Mechanism 2 first runs a learning algorithm on Alice’s and
Bob’s report profile to derive a scoring function, and then pays Alice and Bob by Mechanism 1.
Mechanism 2 Φ-divergence pairing mechanism with a learning algorithm MΦ,L
Parameters: A convex function Φ, and a learning algorithm L with mL samples.
Input: A report profile (xˆ, yˆ) from Alice and Bob on m tasks where m ≥ 2 +mL.
1: Partition m tasks (arbitrarily) into a set of learning tasks ML and a set of scoring tasks MS
where |ML| ≥ mL and |MS | ≥ 2. Let (xˆL, yˆL) be the reports from Alice and Bob on the
learning tasks ML, and (xˆS , yˆS) be the reports on the scoring tasks.
2: Run the learning algorithm and derive Kest = L(xˆL, yˆL).
3: Run the Φ-pairing mechanism (Mechanism 1) with the scoring function Kest, and pay Alice
and Bob accordingly.
Theorem 6.1. Let Φ be a continuous convex function with [0,∞) ⊆ dom(Φ), mL be an integer,
L be a learning algorithm on mL samples, a function SL : R × R → N, and P be a set of joint
distributions on X × Y.
Suppose the common prior between Alice and Bob satisfying Assumption 1 with PX,Y ∈ P,
and L is (δ, )-accurate on (P,Φ) with SL(δ, ) samples. Under three conditions in Assumption 2
respectively, Mechanism 2 is
1. (δ, )-truthful on P with a 2 + SL(δ, ) number of tasks;
2. (δ, )-informed-truthful on P with a 2 + SL(δ, ) number of tasks;
3. (δ, )-strongly truthful on P with a 2 + SL(δ, ) number of tasks.
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Let P ∈ P be Alice and Bob’s signals joint distribution. Here L only outputs an -ideal scoring
function on the joint distribution of agents’ signals. Still, the algorithm can have an arbitrarily large
error when agents are not truthtelling. For instance, there may exists a non-truth-telling strategy
profile θ such that θ ◦P is not in P, and the output of L is not -ideal on (θ ◦P,Φ). Nevertheless,
Mechanism 2 still can upper bound their ex-ante payment under such non-truth-telling strategy
profiles. Furthermore, if the learning algorithm is -ideal on (θ ◦P,Φ) for all strategy profile θ, the
pairing mechanism is indeed approximately dominantly truthful. We give a more detail discussion
in Sect. E.
Remark 6.2. Note that the truthfulness guarantees are subject to the belief of Alice (and Bob).
Mechanism 2 ensures with 1 − δ probability the payment under truth-telling strategy profile is 
close to a fixed strongly truthful (inform-truthful or truthful) mapping for all δ ∈ (0, 1) and  > 0.14
In particular, we make the error  sufficiently small such that the truth-telling strategy profile still
has a higher ex-ante payment than any oblivious strategy has with high probability.
Furthermore, we can pick Φ such that the ex-ante payment is bounded by some constant U ,
and the mechanism is ( + Uδ)-strongly (informed-) truthful with probability 1. For example, if
Φ(a) = |a−1|/2, we only need to consider bounded scoring functions, and the resulting mechanism
is approximately informed-truthful with probability 1.
To establish some intuitions, let’s consider the following “fantasy” mapping FΦ = (FΦA , F
Φ
B )
from Alice’s and Bob’s signals’ joint distribution P and their strategy profile θ to payments:
FΦA (θ, P ) , uA(θ, P,K?θ◦P,Φ) and FΦB (θ, P ) , uB(θ, P,K?θ◦P,Φ). (8)
It is straightforward to show the following lemma.
Lemma 6.3 (Fantasy mapping). Under the first three conditions in Assumption 2 respectively, the
mapping FΦ = (FΦA , F
Φ
B ) is
1. truthful,
2. informed-truthful, or
3. strongly truthful.
Recall that a learning algorithm for scoring function with input samples from Q outputs an
approximate ideal function K?Q,Φ. If Alice and Bob have a strategy profile θ with joint signal
distribution P , the learning tasks are sampled from distribution θ ◦P and a learning algorithm for
scoring function will output an approximate version of K?θ◦P,Φ. Therefore, the ex-ante payment to
Alice in Mechanism 2 is “close” to fantasy payment function, and Theorem 6.1 formalizes this idea.
We show the proof in Appendix C.
7 Learning Ideal Scoring Functions
Theorem 6.1 reduces the mechanism design problem to a learning problem for an ideal scoring
function. However, Eqn. (7) may be hard to verify. We provide two natural sufficient conditions
for -ideal scoring functions in Sect. 7.1, and we will provide two concrete learning algorithms for
scoring function in Sect. 7.2. Finally, in Sect. 7.3 we show an obstacle to designing exact strongly
truthful, or inform-truthful mechanisms which use the Φ-divergence-based method.
14Formally, there exists an event with probability 1− δ such that the conditional expected payment to Alice under
such event is -close to a strongly truthful (inform-truthful or truthful) mapping.
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7.1 Sufficient Conditions for Approximately Φ-Ideal Scoring Functions
Bregman divergence Given a, b ∈ R and a strictly convex and twice differentiable Φ : R→ R,
the standard Bregman divergence is Φ(a)−Φ(b)−∇Φ(b)>(a− b). It can be extended to Bregman
divergence between two functionals f and g over a probability space (Ω,F , P ) [4]
BΦ,P (f, g) =
∫
Φ(f(ω))− Φ(g(ω))−∇Φ(g(ω))>(f(ω)− g(ω))dP (ω).
Lemma 7.1 (Bregman divergence and accuracy). If Φ is strictly convex and twice differentiable
on [0,∞),
DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY )− uA(τ , P,K) = BΦ∗,PXPY (K,K?).
Therefore, if BΦ∗,PXPY (K,K
?) ≤ , K is an -ideal scoring function on (Φ, P ).
Since Bregman divergence capture an average distance between a scoring function K and the
ideal one, if the scoring function K is uniformly close to the ideal one K?, the Bergman divergence
between K and K? is also small.
Total variation distance On the other hand, we may first learn the prior P and compute
an approximately ideal scoring function afterward. This indirect method is also useful, because
estimating the probability density function is a much well studied problem.
Theorem 7.2 (Total variation to accuracy). Given Φ is a convex function and a prior PX,Y over
a finite space X × Y, suppose there exist constants 0 < α < 1 and cL such that
∀x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, PX,Y (x, y) > 2α or PX,Y (x, y) = 0, (9)
∀z, w ∈ [α, 1/α], |Φ(z)− Φ(w)| ≤ cL|z − w|. (10)
If ‖PˆX,Y − PX,Y ‖TV ≤ δ < α,15 Kˆ(x, y) ∈ ∂Φ
(
PˆX,Y
PˆX⊗PˆY
)
is a 6cL
α2
δ-ideal scoring function.
The first condition says the smallest nonzero probability PX,Y (x, y) is either constantly away
from zero or equal to zero, and the second condition requires the function Φ is Lipschitz in [α, 1/α]
which holds for all examples in Table 1. With these conditions, if we have a good estimation Pˆ
for P with small total variation distance, we can compute a very accurate scoring function Kˆ from
Pˆ . As we will see in Sect. 7.2, the empirical distributions with mL samples satisfies this condition
with high probability for large enough mL.
7.2 Learning Algorithms for Scoring Functions
Generative approach Recall that if P is known, the ideal scoring function can be computed
directly. In a generative approach, we try to estimate the probability density function P from
reports and derive the scoring function afterward under the truth-telling strategy profile. In general
this generative approach is useful when P is on a finite space, or P is a parametric model by
Theorem 7.2. Here we provide an example of a generative approach.
A standard way of learning probability density function is to use empirical distribution on mL
samples (defined in Eqn. (14)). The following theorem shows that the empirical distribution gives
a good estimation in terms of total variation distance.
15‖Pˆ − Pˆ‖TV = ∑ω∈Ω |P (ω)− Pˆ (ω)| is the total variation distance between P and Pˆ .
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Algorithm 3 A generative algorithm
Input: A report profile XˆL, YˆL ∈ (X × Y)mL from learning tasks from Alice and Bob.
Parameters: A convex function Φ and its sub-gradient ∂Φ
1: Compute empirical distribution from Alice’s and Bob’s reports: for all events E in X × Y
PˆX,Y (E) =
1
mL
mL∑
s=1
I[(xˆs, yˆs) ∈ E],
and compute the marginal empirical distribution, for all events E in X and F in Y
PˆX(E) =
1
mL
mL∑
s=1
I[xˆs ∈ E], and PˆY (F ) = 1
mL
mL∑
s=1
I[yˆs ∈ F ].
2: Compute the scoring function asKˆ(x, y) ∈ ∂Φ
(
PˆX,Y (x,y)
PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
)
, if PˆX(x)PˆY (y) 6= 0
Kˆ(x, y) = 0, otherwise.
(11)
Lemma 7.3 (Theorem 3.1 in [6]). For all  > 0, δ > 0, finite domain Ω, distribution in P in ∆Ω,
there exists M = O
(
1
2
max(|Ω|, log(1/δ))) such that for all mL ≥ M the empirical distribution
with mL i.i.d. samples, PˆmL, satisfies
Pr[‖P − PˆmL‖TV ≤ ] ≥ 1− δ.
Therefore, we can design a learning algorithm Lemp as follows: estimate joint distribution
PX,Y by their empirical distributions PˆX,Y and derive Kˆ from Theorem 7.2. By Theorem 7.2 and
Lemma 7.3, such algorithm is -accurate with 1− δ probability.
Discriminative approach Instead of density estimation, a discriminative approach estimates
an ideal scoring functions directly. This enables more freedom of algorithm design. Here we use
the variational representation (Theorem 2.5), and give an optimization characterization of an ideal
scoring function.
Given the assumption 1, under the truth-telling strategy profile we can have i.i.d. samples
of (u, v) where u is sampled from PX,Y and v is sampled from PXPY independently, and this is
shown formally in Algorithm 4. Taking LΦ(a, b) , a − Φ∗(b) as the risk function, we can convert
the estimation of the ideal scoring functions to empirical risk minimization (maximization) over a
training set (ut, vt) with t = 1, 2, . . . , bmL/3c,
K˜ = arg max
k∈K
∑
t
LΦ(k(ut), k(vt)) = arg max
k∈K
{∫
k(ω)dPˆX,Y (ω)−
∫
Φ∗(k(ω))d ˆPXPY (ω)
}
(12)
where K is a pre-specified class of functionals k : X × Y → R, PˆX,Y and ˆPXPY are empirical
distributions on bmL/3c samples from distributions PX,Y and PXPY respectively. See Appendix A.2
for formal definitions when X and Y are general measure spaces.
Assuming that K is a convex set of functionals, the implementation of (12) only requires solving
a convex optimization problem over function space K which is well studied [22]. With these results,
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we show the empirical risk maximizer K˜ with respect to LΦ is -accurate with large probability
under some conditions on K and prior PX,Y . Furthermore, this error can be seen as the generalized
error of the empirical risk maximizer.
Algorithm 4 An empirical risk minimization algorithm
Input: A report profile XˆL, YˆL ∈ (X × Y)mL from learning tasks from Alice and Bob.
Parameters: A convex function Φ and its conjugate Φ∗.
1: Partition the report profile into three equal size (xˆi, yˆi) in (X ×Y)mL/3 where i = 0, 1, and 2.
2: For the empirical joint distribution, we use the report profile xi,yi to compute: For all events
E in X × Y
P˜X,Y (E) ,
3
mL
mL/3∑
s=1
I[(xˆ0s, yˆ0s) ∈ E],
Further compute the product empirical distributions: for all events E
P˜iP˜j(A) ,
3
mL
mL/3∑
s=1
I[(xˆ1s, yˆ2s) ∈ E]
(Note that we use new samples to compute the product of empirical distribution to ensure the
independence between P˜X P˜Y and P˜X,Y )
3: Finally solve following optimization problem
K˜ = arg max
k∈K
{∫
k(ω)dP˜X,Y (ω)−
∫
Φ∗(k(ω))dP˜X P˜Y (ω)
}
(13)
Theorem 7.4. Consider a distribution P over X × Y; a strictly convex and a twice differentiable
function Φ on [0,∞) with its gradient Φ′ and conjugate Φ∗; a family of functional K from X × Y
to dom(Φ∗); and Φ∗(K) = {Φ∗(k) : k ∈ K}. Suppose
1. the (P,Φ)-ideal scoring function K? = Φ′
(
PX,Y
PXPY
)
is in K, and
2. there exist constants (Ll, Rl, Dl)l=1,2
(a) supk∈K ρL1(k, PX,Y ) ≤ R1, and
∫ R1
0
√
H[],L1(u,K, PX,Y )du ≤ D1
(b) supl∈Φ∗(K) ρL2(l, PXPY ) ≤ R2 and
∫ R2
0
√
H[],L2(u,Φ∗(K), PXPY )du ≤ D2
There exists M = O
(
1
ε2
log 1δ
)
, such that for all mL ≥M , K˜ defined in (13) is ε-accurate on prior
P with probability 1− δ. 16
Informally, Theorem 7.4 requires the functional class K contains an ideal scoring function and
it has a constant complexity (generalized entropy with bracketing). Under these conditions, the
empirical risk minimizer (maximizer) can estimate the ideal scoring function accurately even when
the signal space can be integers, real numbers, or Euclidean spaces.
Here we give a outline of the proof. By Lemma 7.1, it is sufficient to show the empirical risk
minimizer K˜ has small Bregman divergence form the ideal one. Moreover, if the estimation K
16Here we do not show the dependency on constants Ll, Rl and Dl.
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is the empirical risk maximizer, this error can be upper bounded by the distance between the
empirical distribution and the real distribution (Lemma 7.5). Therefore, we can use functional
form of Central Limit Theorem to upper bound the error (Theorem A.6). We defer the proof to
the appendix.
Lemma 7.5. Let K˜ be the estimate of K? obtained by solving Eqn. (13), and K? ∈ K Then
BΦ∗,PXPY (K˜,K
?) ≤ sup
k∈K
∣∣∣∣∫ Φ∗(k − Φ∗(K?)d(P˜X P˜Y − PXPY )− ∫ (k −K?) d(P˜X,Y − PX,Y )∣∣∣∣ .
Example (continued). For Φ(a) = a log a, if the parameters σ2, τ2 are in a bounded set, we can
take K as a set of the quadratic functions with bounded coefficients. By Theorem 2.7.11 [30], the
general bracket entropy of K and Φ∗(K) can be bounded by some constants.
7.3 Nonexistence of Unbiased Estimators for Φ-divergence
Combining Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 7.2 or 7.4 we can design mechanisms that are -strongly
truthful (inform-truthful, or truthful) with high probability. However, is it possible to have an exact
informed-truthful or strongly truthful? In this section, we show a technical obstacle to designing
such mechanisms.
The main observation of Theorem 4.1 and 6.1 is that the ex-ante payment to an agent has
a close connection to the Φ-divergence from signal pairs on penalty tasks to signal pairs on the
bonus task and use this Φ-divergence to upper bound ex-ante payment under all manipulations
uniformly. This observation is also used in [26] and [15]. Under this framework, showing exact
strongly truthful, informed-truthful, or truthful requires unbiased estimator of Φ-divergence from
i.i.d. samples. Specifically, suppose we can estimate an ideal scoring function accurately from
samples. We can estimate the Φ-divergence without bias. The following theorem shows such
estimator does not exist in general.
Theorem 7.6 (Nonexistence). Suppose the discrete signal spaces of Alice and Bob, X and Y, both
have more than two elements, and Φ be twice differentiable convex function in [0,∞). For all m ∈ N
all estimator Dˆ : (X × Y)m → R from m pairs of signals (x,y) = (x1, y1, . . . , xm, ym) to a real
value, there exists a prior distribution PX,Y over X × Y such that
E
(x,y)∼PmX,Y
[Dˆ(x,y)] 6= DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ).
The key idea of this proof is that if we fix the estimator Dˆ and take the probability distribution
P as variables, the expected value E[Dˆ(x,y)] is a polynomial of distribution P . However, the
Φ-divergence EPXPY
[
Φ
(
PX,Y
PXPY
)]
is usually not a polynomial, and we can fine one PX,Y to make
these two values not equal. The proof is in Appendix D.3.
8 Machine Learning and Multiple Agents
We have discussed the Φ-pairing mechanisms on two agents, Alice and Bob. What can we do if
there are more than two agents, Alice, Bob, . . . ? We first discuss two naive approaches which
reduce the multiple agents setting to the two agent setting. Then we propose two novel approaches
that exploit the power of current machine learning algorithms.
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Two naive approaches First, we can pair Alice with a randomly chosen peer agent and run our
mechanism.17 This approach keeps the sample complexity low as the number of agents increases.
However, if the average quality of agents’ reports decreases as the number of agents increases, Alice
will receive less payment and may give up working. For example, say only Alice and Bob work on
the tasks and the rest of agents report random noise. Alice will now only have positive expected
payment if her randomly matched peer is Bob. As the number of agents increases, her expected
payment will go to zero.
On the other hand, we can pair Alice simultaneously with all other agents, and run our mech-
anism. As the number of agents increases, this approach ensures Alice’s expected payment is non-
decreasing. This is because the mutual information does not decrease by adding more information—
the additional agents’ reports. However, in the extreme example above, where only Alice and Bob
work, the sample complexity for ideal scoring function will increase.
Computing the Φ-Mutual Information between Xi and X−i A challenge to employing this
second method is to reliably compute the Φ-mutual information between Alice’s reports, Xi, and
those of the other agents, X−i. Our variation method is well suited to this challenge.
Recall that Mechanism 2 reduces the mechanism design problem to learning a scoring rule,
which Eqn. (2) reduces to learning
JPP (xi, x−i) =
PXi,X−i(xi, x−i)
PXi(xi)PY (x−i)
=
PXi|X−i(xi | x−i)
PXi(xi)
.
Therefore, it is enough to learn both the marginal distribution, PXi(xi) and PXi|X−i(xi | x−i).
The former can be estimated empirically. However, when the number of agents is large, the later
is high dimensional and must be learned. Fortunately, this is just a soft-classifier18 which, given
the reports of every agent but Alice on a particular task, (soft) predicts Alice’s report on the same
task.
Therefore, we can derive an approximate ideal scoring rule by using machine learning techniques
to produce a (soft) prediction of Alice’s report for an answer given the reports of the other agents.
Specifically, the machine learning algorithm outputs f(·, ·) such that f(xi, x−i) = PXi|X−i(xi | x−i).
Using Mechanism 2, we can divide the tasks into training and testing tasks. The training tasks
are used to learn f and to estimate PX(x). We can compute Kest from f and PX(x), and then use
Mechanism 2 to pay the agents.
Note that for the guarantees of Theorem 6.1 to hold, it is required that f is learned accurately
on truthful strategy profiles. However, we do not require the learning algorithms perform well on
non-truthful strategy profiles.
Latent Variable Models Our pairing mechanisms are particularly powerful when the prior P
on agents’ signals is a latent variable model. In a latent variable model, signals are mutually
independent conditioned on the latent variables. Examples include Dawid-Skene models, Gaussian
17Formally, suppose in agents’ common prior each pair of agents’ signals is from a stochastic relevant prior family
P, and the learning algorithm LΦ is (, δ)-accurate with mL samples over P. The above mechanism is -strongly
(informed) truthful with probability at least 1 − δ. For example, if all agents’ signal are from a finite set Z and for
any pair of agents their signals are stochastic relevant and satisfy Eqns. (21) and (22), then by Theorem 7.2 and
Lemma 7.3, for any , δ > 0, there exists S(δ, ) = O
(
c2L
α42
·max{|Z|2, log 1
δ
})
, such that the above mechanism is
(δ, )-strongly truthful, inform-truthful, or truthful) with S(δ, ) tasks. The similar argument works for continuous
signal by Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 7.4.
18That is, it produces a forecast to predict her report rather than a single report.
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mixture models, hidden Markov models, and latent Dirichlet allocations. When P is a latent
variable model, we can pay Alice the (approximate) mutual information between her report and
each task’s latent variable.
1. Given a latent label recovery algorithm e.g., [34], we run such algorithm on all reports except
Alice’s, and get estimate of latent label for each tasks (Y1, . . . , Ym);
2. Then, using Alice’s report (X1, . . . , Xm) and the estimated latent label (Y1, . . . , Ym) we can
run Mechanism 2 and Algorithm 3 to pay Alice the mutual information between Alice’s report
and the latent labels.
This mechanism is (approximate) strongly truthful, because the Φ-mutual information between
Alice and the others’ reports is less than the Φ-mutual information between her reports and the
tasks’ latent variable due to data processing inequality. This approach has the following advan-
tages. First, this provides a reduction from aggregation to elicitation. Second, paying mutual
information between Alice’s reports and the latent variable resolves the problems that the above
naive approaches have. Alice’s payment increases as the number of agents increases by the data
processing inequality and the sample complexity of scoring function mirrors that of the latent label
algorithm, which typically will not increase.
9 Conclusion
We showed how to reduce the design of peer prediction information elicitation in the multitask
setting to a learning problem. As a result, we extend multitask peer prediction to the continuous
setting for parametric models with bounded learning complexity. We also obtain improved bounds
on the sample complexity for the finite signal setting. We note that in practice one could use deep
learning techniques to learn the scoring function. However, we leave it for future work to obtain
rigorous bounds in this setting.
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A Supplementary materials
A.1 Convex analysis
Here is a useful table for some standard Φs and their conjugate: Theorem 2.5 is a direct result of
Table 1: Common Φ, its convex conjugate and subgradient
Φ-divergence Φ(a) Φ∗(b) ∂Φ(a)
Total variation 12 |a− 1|
{
b, if |b| ≤ 1/2
+∞, otherwise

1/2, if a > 1
−1/2, if a < 1
[−1/2, 1/2] if a = 1
KL-divergence a log a exp(b− 1) 1 + log a
χ2-divergence a2 − 1 b2/4 + 1 2a
Squared Hellinger distance (1−√a)2
{
b/(1− b), if b < 1
−∞, otherwise 1− 1/
√
a
Young-Fenchel inequality:
Theorem A.1 (Young-Fenchel inequality). Given a ∈ dom(Φ), for all b ∈ dom(Φ∗),
Φ(a) ≥ ab− Φ∗(b),
where the equality holds when b ∈ ∂Φ(a) = {d : Φ(c) ≥ Φ(a) + 〈d, c − a〉}, and b = Φ′(a) if Φ is
convex and differential at a.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. By the definition of Φ-divergence,
DΦ(P‖Q) =E
Q
[
Φ
(
P
Q
)]
=E
Q
[
sup
b
{
b · P
Q
− Φ∗(b)
}]
(by Young-Fenchel)
= sup
k:Ω→dom(Φ∗)
{
E
Q
[
k(ω) · P (ω)
Q(ω)
− Φ∗(k(ω))
]}
= sup
k:Ω→dom(Φ∗)
{
E
Q
[
k(ω) · P (ω)
Q(ω)
]
− E
Q
[Φ∗(k(ω))]
}
= sup
k:Ω→dom(Φ∗)
{
E
P
[k(ω)]− E
Q
[Φ∗(k(ω))]
}
Therefore, by Young-Fenchel inequality the equlity holds when k(ω) ∈ ∂Φ(P (ω)/Q(ω)) almost
everywhere on Q.
This formulation is powerful. For example, it can yield the data processing inequality easily.
Corollary A.2 (Data processing inequality). Consider a channel that produces Y given X based
on the distribution PY |X where Pr[Y |X] = PY |X . Given distributions PX and QX of X and PY |X ,
PY is the (marginal) distribution of Y when X is sampled from PX and QY is the distribution of
Y when X is generated by QX , then for any Φ-divergence DΦ,
DΦ(PX‖QX) ≥ DΦ(PY ‖QY ).
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Proof of Corollary A.2. By Theorem 2.5, there exists a real-valued function g : Y → R such that
DΦ(PY ‖QY ) = E
PY
[g]− E
QY
[Φ∗(g)]
=
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)g(y)−
∑
y∈Y
QY (y)Φ
∗(g(y))
=
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
PX(x)PY |X(y, x)g(y)−
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
QX(x)PY |X(y, x)Φ∗(g(y))
=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)
∑
y∈Y
PY |X(y, x)g(y)−
∑
x∈X
QX(x)
∑
y∈Y
PY |X(y, x)Φ∗(g(y)).
Because Φ∗ is convex and for all x ∈ X , PY |X(y, x) is a distribution over y, we have for all x in X ,∑
y∈Y PY |X(y, x)Φ
∗(g(y)) ≥ Φ∗
(∑
y∈Y PY |X(y, x)g(y)
)
. Therefore we have
DΦ(PY ‖QY ) ≤
∑
x∈X
PX(x)
∑
y∈Y
PY |X(y, x)g(y)
−∑
x∈X
QX(x)Φ
∗
∑
y∈Y
PY |X(y, x)g(y)
 .
Define h(x) ,
∑
y∈Y PY |X(y, x)g(y), and we can further simplify it as
DΦ(PY ‖QY ) ≤
∑
x∈X
PX(x)h(x)−
∑
x∈X
QX(x)Φ
∗ (h(x))
≤ sup
h:X→R
∑
x∈X
PX(x)h(x)−
∑
x∈X
QX(x)Φ
∗ (h(x))
=DΦ(PX‖QX)
which completes the proof.
A.2 Upper bounds for empirical processes
In this section, we provide some standard results on empirical process, most of which are in van de
Geer and van de Geer [29]. Consider n independent and identically (i.i.d.) random variables
X1, X2, . . . , Xn with distribution P on a measurable space (Ω,F). Let Pˆn be the empirical distri-
bution based on those n random variables, i.e., for each set A ∈ F ,
Pˆn(A) =
1
n
{number of Xi ∈ A, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} = 1
n
n∑
i=1
I[Xi ∈ A] (14)
and let K ⊂ L2(P ) = {k : Ω → R :
∫ |k|2dP < ∞} be a collection of functions. The empirical
process indexed by K is
Vn(K) =
{
vn(k) =
√
n
∫
kd(Pˆn − P ) : k ∈ K
}
. (15)
In this paper, we are mainly interested in uniform upper bound for Eqn. (15), i.e., upperbounds for
sup
k∈K
|vn(k)| (16)
which can be think as the “radius” of random process (15). To upper bound (16), there are several
notions for “complexity of functional spaces”. Here are some examples. If Ω ⊆ R, the set of
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cumulative density functions is {kx : kx(ω) = I[ω < x], x ∈ R}, and the upperbound for (16)
implies the Central Limit Theorem. We can consider a family of sets A ⊆ F and a functional class
over it {kA : kA(ω) = I[ω ∈ A], A ∈ A}, and the upper bound for (16) can be characterized by the
VC-dimension of the family of sets A. Or if P is a distribution d-dimensional Gaussian and there
is a set of linear functional {kv : kv(ω) = v>ω, ‖v‖2 ≤ 1}, we can use metric entropy to encode
their complexity.
Now let us introduce some notions of functional complexity we used in the paper.
Definition A.3. Given k ∈ K, L > 0, and distribution P , we define
ρ2L(k, P ) , 2L2
∫
exp
( |k|
L
)
− 1− |k|
L
dP
the Bernstein difference between k1 and k2 is then ρ
2
L(k1−k2, P ) which can be seen as an extension
of L2(P )-norm, because 2(e
x − 1− x) ≈ x2 when x is small.
Definition A.4 (Generalized entropy with bracketing). Let N[],L(δ,L, P ) be the smallest value
of n for which there exists n pairs of functions {(kLj , kUj )} such that ρL(kUj − kLj , P ) ≤ δ for all
j = 1, . . . , n and such that for all k ∈ K there is a j such that for all ω ∈ Ω
kLj (ω) ≤ k(ω) ≤ kUj (ω).
Then H[],L(δ,K, P ) = logN[],L(δ,K, P ) is called the generalized entropy with bracketing.
A useful application of bracketing is to classes of parametric functions {kt : t ∈ T} that are
Lipschitz in the parameter t ∈ T : There exists a metric d on T and a function F : Ω→ R such that
|kt(w)− fs(w)| ≤ d(s, t)F (w) for all w ∈ Ω
Then the bracketing numbers of this class are bounded by the covering numbers of T .
Theorem A.5. Let KT = {kt : t ∈ T} be a set of function satisfying the above condition. Then
for any norm ‖ · ‖ and  > 0,
N[](2‖F‖,K, ‖ · ‖) ≤ N (, T, d).
The following theorem shows the random variable (16) is subgaussian when the generalized
entropy with bracketing is bounded.
Theorem A.6 (A uniform inequality [29]). Given a functional class K and distribution P , if there
exist constants L, R, A, B, and C such that supk∈K ρL(k, P ) ≤ R and
∫ R
0
√
H[],L(u,K, P )du ≤ C
√
(A+ 1)B2 (max {R,C}) ≤  ≤ AR
2
L
√
n
Then the empirical process Vn(K) is bounded as
Pr
[
sup
k∈K
|vn(k)| ≥ 
]
≤ B exp
(
− 
2
(A+ 1)B2R2
)
.
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B Proofs in Sect. 5
Lemma 5.2 (Manipulation in strategies and scoring functions). For any strategy profile θ and
scoring function K,19
uA(θ, P,K) ≤ DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ).
There are two aspects of manipulation: the reports for bonus and penalty tasks and the scoring
functions K. The first one can be handled through Data Processing inequality and the second is
shown through the variational representation of Φ-divergence.
Proof. The expected utility for Alice is
uA(θ, P,K)
= E
X,Y
[
E
θ
[
K
(
Xˆb, Yˆb
)
| X,Y
]]
− E
X,Y
[
E
θ
[
Φ∗
(
K
(
Xˆp, Yˆq
))
| X,Y
]]
= E
X,Y
∑
xˆ,yˆ
θA(Xb, xˆ)θB(Yb, yˆ)K(xˆ, yˆ)
− E
X,Y
∑
xˆ,yˆ
θA(Xp, xˆ)θB(Yq, yˆ)Φ
∗ (K(xˆ, yˆ))

=
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y)
∑
xˆ,yˆ
θA(x, xˆ)θB(y, yˆ)K(xˆ, yˆ)−
∑
x,y
PX(x)PY (y)
∑
xˆ,yˆ
θA(x, xˆ)θB(y, yˆ)Φ
∗ (K(xˆ, yˆ)) .
The last equality uses the fact that PX,Y is the joint distribution of signals on bonus task b, (xb, yb) ,
and PXPY is the joint distribution of signals on penalty tasks p and q, (xp, yq) due to Assumption 1.
Because Φ∗ is convex and fixing x and y, θA(x, xˆ)θB(y, yˆ) is a distribution over X × Y, by
Jensen’s inequality we have
∑
xˆ,yˆ
θA(x, xˆ)θB(y, yˆ)Φ
∗ (K(xˆ, yˆ)) ≤ Φ∗
∑
xˆ,yˆ
θA(x, xˆ)θB(y, yˆ)Ki,B(xˆ, yˆ)
 (17)
where the equality holds only if Φ∗ is not strictly convex or K(xˆ, yˆ) is constant in the support of
(xˆ, yˆ) 7→ θA(x, xˆ)θB(y, yˆ). Let L(x, y) ,
∑
xˆ,yˆ θA(x, xˆ)θB(y, yˆ)K(xˆ, yˆ). Apply Eqn. (17) to uA and
we have
uA ≤
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y)L(x, y)−
∑
x,y
PX(x)PY (y)Φ
∗ (L(x, y))
≤ sup
K:X×Y→R
{∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y)K(x, y)−
∑
x,y
PX(x)PY (y)Φ
∗ (K(x, y))
}
(18)
=DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ).
The last inequality holds by Theorem 2.5, and it completes the proof.
Lemma 5.1 (Truth-telling). If K? is a (PX,Y ,Φ)-ideal scoring function,
uA(τ , P,K
?) = DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ).
19There are some minor details when X and Y are not finite set. Here we require K and θ to have finite ∫ K dPX,Y ,∫
Φ∗(K)d(PXPY ),
∫
K dθA dθBdPX,Y ,and
∫
Φ∗(K) dθA dθBdPXPY .
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Proof Lemma 5.1. By Theorem 2.5, and the definition of Truth-telling strategy profile, we have
uA(τ , P,K
?)
= E
X,Y
[
E
τ
[
K?
(
Xˆb, Yˆb
)
| X,Y
]]
− E
X,Y
[
E
τ
[
Φ∗
(
K?
(
Xˆp, Yˆq
))
| X,Y
]]
= E
X,Y
[K?(Xb, Yb)]− E
X,Y
[Φ∗ (K?(Xp, Yq))] (definition of τ )
=
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y)K
?(x, y)−
∑
x,y
PX(x)PY (y)Φ
∗ (K?(x, y))
= sup
K:X×Y→R
{∑
PX,YK −
∑
PXPY Φ
∗ (K)
}
(by Theorem 2.5 and K?)
=DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ).
Moreover, because PX,Y is stochastic relevant, DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ) > 0.
Lemma 5.3 (Oblivious strategy). If θ is an oblivious strategy profile, for any scoring function K
uA(θ, P,K) ≤ 0.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Recall that an oblivious strategy θA is oblivious to the private signal: for any
x ,x′ and xˆ in X , θA(x, xˆ) = θA(x′, xˆ), and we can define a distribution µA ∈ ∆X such that for all x
and xˆ in X , µA(xˆ) , θA(x, xˆ). We also define νB(yˆ) ,
∑
y PY (y)θB(y, yˆ) where νB is a distribution
on Y and independent to µA.
uA(θ, P,K)
= E
X,Y
[
E
θ
[
K
(
Xˆb, Yˆb
)
| X,Y
]]
− E
X,Y
[
E
θ
[
Φ∗
(
K
(
Xˆp, Yˆq
))
| X,Y
]]
= E
X,Y
∑
xˆ,yˆ
θA(Xb, xˆ)θB(Yb, yˆ)K(xˆ, yˆ)
− E
X,Y
∑
xˆ,yˆ
θi(Xp, xˆ)θB(Yq, yˆ)Φ
∗ (K(xˆ, yˆ))

= E
X,Y
∑
xˆ,yˆ
µA(xˆ)θB(Yb, yˆ)K(xˆ, yˆ)
− E
X,Y
∑
xˆ,yˆ
µA(k)θB(Yp, yˆ)Φ
∗ (K(xˆ, yˆ))

=
∑
xˆ,yˆ
µA(xˆ)νB(yˆ) [K(xˆ, yˆ)− Φ∗ (K(xˆ, yˆ))] (by the definition of νB)
≤
∑
xˆ,yˆ
µA(xˆ)νB(yˆ)
[
sup
b∈dom(Φ∗)
{1 · b− Φ∗ (y)}
]
= sup
b∈dom(Φ∗)
{1 · b− Φ∗ (y)}
=Φ∗∗(1) = Φ(1) = 0.
The last inequality is from the Definition 2.4.
Lemma 5.4. Moreover, given Conditions 3 in Assumption 2, the equality in (6) for Alice or Bob
occurs if and only if
1. θ = (piA, piB) which is a permutation strategy profile, and
2. For all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, K(piA(x), piB(y)) = Φ′ (JP(x, y)) = Φ′
(
PX,Y (x,y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
.
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Proof of Lemma 5.4. We first prove the first property: θA and θB are permutations. Note that by
the proof of Lemma 5.2, uA(θ, P,K) = DΦ(Pi,j‖PiPj) if and only if (17) and (18) are equalities,
because X and Y are finite
Given Alice’s and Bob’s strategies θA and θB, let SA(x) , {xˆ ∈ X : θA(x, xˆ) > 0}, SB(y) ,
{yˆ ∈ Y : θB(y, yˆ) > 0} be the support of strategy θA on signal x and θB on y respectively. Because
Φ∗ is strictly convex and Φ is differentiable, uA(θ, P,K) = DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ) if and only if (17),
and (18) are equality. Thus
∀x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, xˆ ∈ SA(x), yˆ ∈ SB(y), K(xˆ, yˆ) = Φ′
(
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
. (19)
That is all reports pairs (xˆ, yˆ) in the support of strategy θA on x and θB on y have the same score,
K(xˆ, yˆ). Moreover, the value equals to Φ′ (PX,Y (x, y)/(PX(x)PY (y))). Now we use this observation
to finish the proof.
⇒) Because θA(x, ·) induces a probability, |SA(x)| ≥ 1 for all x. Suppose θA is not a permutation.
Because X is finite, there exists x1 6= x2 and xˆ∗ in X such that xˆ∗ ∈ SA(x1) and xˆ∗ ∈ SA(x2). By
(19), for all y and yˆ ∈ SB(y),
Φ′
(
PX,Y (x1, y)
PX(x1)PY (y)
)
= K(xˆ∗, yˆ) = Φ′
(
PX,Y (x2, y)
PX(x2)PY (y)
)
.
Because Φ is strictly convex and differentiable, Φ′ is invertible, and thus for all y ∈ Y,
PX,Y (x1, y)
PX(x1)PY (y)
=
PX,Y (x2, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
which shows PX,Y is not stochastic relevant— Given signal x1 Alice’s poster for Bob’s signal is iden-
tical to her poster with signal x2— and reaches contradiction. Therefore there exist permutations
piA and piB over X and Y such that θA = piA and θB = piB.
For the second part, by (19), for all x, y we have
K(piA(x), piB(y)) = Φ
′
(
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
.
⇐) On the other hand, if θA = piA and θB = piB which are permutations, and for all x, y, and
K(piA(x), piB(y)) = Φ
′ (PX,Y (x, y)/(PX(x)PY (y))), we can apply Eqn. (19), and have uA(θ, P,K) =
DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ).
C Proofs in Sect. 6.2
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Given a prior P , the payment to Alice under truth-telling strategy profile in
the fantasy function (8) by Lemma 5.1 is
FΦA (τ , P ) = uA(τ , P,K
?
P,Φ) = DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ). (20)
Additionally, by Lemma 5.2,
FΦA (θ, P ) = uA(θ, P,K
?
θ◦P,Φ) ≤ DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ) = FΦA (τ , P )
which shows the truth-telling strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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To show that the mapping is inform-truthful, by Lemma 5.3, if θ is an oblivious strategy
profile, FΦA (θ, P ) = uA(θ, P,K
?
θ◦P,Φ) ≤ 0. Therefore when P is stochastic relevant by Eqn. (20)
and Lemma 5.1 we have
FΦA (θ, P ) ≤ 0 < FΦA (θ, P ).
Finally, to show the mechanism is strongly truthful, if there is a strategy profile θ such that
FΦA (θ, P ) = F
Φ
A (τ , P ), we have
uA(θ, P,K
?
θ◦P,Φ) = uA(τ , P,K
?
P,Φ),
so by Lemma 5.4 θ is a permutation strategy profile which completes the proof.
Note that the statement of Theorem 6.1 is a little subtle. Mentioned in the footnote in Re-
mark 6.2 there the statement consists of two parts of randomness: an event with probability 1− δ,
and the conditional expected payment to Alice under such event is -close to a strongly truthful
(inform-truthful or truthful) mapping. Therefore, to prove Theorem 6.1, it is sufficient to show
there exists an event E such that
1. it happens with probability at least 1− δ,
2. Alice’s conditional ex-ante utility under truth-telling strategy profile is -close to FΦA (τ , P )
defined in (8), and
3. for all strategy profile θ Alice’s conditional ex-ante utility under θ is less than FΦA (θ, P ).
Proof of Theorem 6.1. First, if Alice’s and Bob’s strategy profile is θ, the learning tasks (xˆL, yˆL)
and scoring tasks (xˆS , yˆS) are both generated from distribution θ ◦ P i.i.d.. Additionally, the
ex-ante payment to Alice is over two randomness: learning tasks and scoring tasks. To make
this distinction explicit, we let UA(xˆS , yˆS , xˆL, yˆL) be Alice’s payment when the report profile is
(xˆ, yˆ) = (xˆS , yˆS , xˆL, yˆL). Then Alice’s ex-ante payment under strategy profile θ in mechanism
MΦ,L is
uA(θ;P,MΦ,L) = E
(xˆL,yˆL)∼θ◦PmL ;
(xˆS ,yˆS)∼θ◦PmS
[UA(xˆS , yˆS , xˆL, yˆL)] = E
(xˆL,yˆL)
[
E
(xˆS ,yˆS)
[UA(xˆS , yˆS , xˆL, yˆL) | (xˆL, yˆL)]
]
.
We further define
uA(θ, P,L(xL,yL)) , E
(xˆS ,yˆS)∼θ◦P
[UA(xˆS , yˆS ,xL,yL)]
where the expectation is only taken on the scoring tasks, but the learning tasks are fixed.
Now we define an event
E = {xL,yL) : uA(τ , P,L(xL,yL)) > DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY )− }
which is in the probability space generated by the learning tasks. Because L is (δ, )-accurate on
P and the joint signal distribution P ∈ P, the probability of E is greater than 1− δ.
By the definition of E , for all (xL,yL) ∈ E ,
uA(τ , P,L(xL,yL))
>DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY )− 
=uA(τ , P,K
?
τ◦P,Φ)−  (by Lemma 5.1)
=FΦA (τ , P )−  (by (8))
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Therefore, Alice’s conditional expected payment under truth-telling strategy profile is  close to the
fantasy function.
Finally, it is sufficient that for all (xL,yL), and θ
uA(θ, P,L(xL,yL)) ≤ FΦA (θ, P ).
Formally, for all P ∈ P, θ, and (xL,yL),
uA(θ, P,L(xL,yL))
=uA(τ ,θ ◦ P,L(xL,yL)) (by (5))
≤uA(τ ,θ ◦ P,K?θ◦P,Φ) (by Lemma 5.2)
=uA(θ, P,K
?
θ◦P,Φ) (by (5))
=FΦA (θ, P ),
and we complete the proof.
D Proofs in Sect. 7
D.1 Proofs in Sect. 7.1
Proof of Lemma 7.1.
DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY )− uA(τ , P,K)
=
∫
K?dPX,Y −
∫
Φ∗(K?)dPXPY −
∫
KdPX,Y +
∫
Φ∗(K)dPXPY
=
∫
Φ∗(K)− Φ∗(K?) + dPX,Y
dPXPY
(K? −K) dPXPY
=
∫
Φ∗(K)− Φ∗(K?)− (Φ∗)′ (K?) (K −K?) dPXPY
The last equality holds since K?(x, y) = Φ′
(
dPX,Y (x,y)
dPXPY (x,y)
)
, so (Φ∗)′ (K?(x, y)) = dPX,Y (x,y)dPXPY (x,y) by
Theorem A.1. The final line is indeed the Bregman divergence from K? to K with respect to
measure dPXPY and Φ
∗.
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Let Kˆ be the output of Algorithm 3, and K? be a (Φ, P )-ideal scoring
function defined in (2). We have
uA(τ , P, Kˆ)
= E
X,Y
[
Kˆ(Xb, Yb)
]
− E
X,Y
[
Φ∗
(
Kˆ(Xp, Yq)
)]
=
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y)Kˆ(x, y)− PX(x)PY (y)Φ∗
(
Kˆ(x, y)
)
=
∑
x,y:PX(x)PY (y)6=0
PX(x)PY (y)
[
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
Kˆ(x, y)− Φ∗
(
Kˆ(x, y)
)]
=
∑
PXPY
[
PˆX,Y
PˆX PˆY
Kˆ − Φ∗
(
Kˆ
)
+
(
PX,Y
PXPY
− PˆX,Y
PˆX PˆY
)
Kˆ
]
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Because Kˆ(x, y) ∈ ∂Φ
(
PˆX,Y (x,y)
PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
)
, by Young-Fenchel inequality (Theorem A.1) we have
PˆX,Y (x,y)
PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
Kˆ(x, y)−
Φ∗
(
Kˆ(x, y)
)
= Φ
(
PˆX,Y (x,y)
PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
)
, so
uA(τ , P, Kˆ) =
∑
PXPY
[
Φ
(
PˆX,Y
PˆX PˆY
)
+
(
PX,Y
PXPY
− PˆX,Y
PˆX PˆY
)
Kˆ
]
(21)
On the other hand, by Definition 2.4,
DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ) =
∑
PXPY · Φ
(
PX,Y
PXPY
)
(22)
By combining (21) and (22), we have
DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY )− uA(τ , P,K)
=
∑
PXPY
[
Φ
(
PX,Y
PXPY
)
− Φ
(
PˆX,Y
PˆX PˆY
)
−
(
PX,Y
PXPY
− PˆX,Y
PˆX PˆY
)
Kˆ
]
≤
∑
PX(x)PY (y)
∣∣∣∣∣Φ
(
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
− Φ
(
PˆX,Y (x, y)
PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
)∣∣∣∣∣
+
∑
PX(x)PY (y)
∣∣∣∣∣ PX,Y (x, y)PX(x)PY (y) − PˆX,Y (x, y)PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
∣∣∣∣∣ · |Kˆ(x, y)|
Thus, it is sufficient to show
∑
PX(x)PY (y)
∣∣∣∣∣Φ
(
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
− Φ
(
PˆX,Y (x, y)
PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3cLδα2 (23)∑
PX(x)PY (y)
∣∣∣∣∣ PX,Y (x, y)PX(x)PY (y) − PˆX,Y (x, y)PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
∣∣∣∣∣ · |Kˆ(x, y)| ≤ 3cLδα2 (24)
For all x PX(x) is nonzero by assumption 1. By the assumption in the statement PX,Y > 2α if
it’s not zero, so PX(x) > 2α. Furthermore, since ‖PX,Y − PˆX,Y ‖TV ≤ δ < α, PˆX(x) ≥ α. Therefore
for all x and y, PX,Y (x, y) 6= 0 we have
α ≤ PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
and
PˆX,Y (x, y)
PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
≤ 1
α
. (25)
To prove (24), we first show an upper bound for |Kˆ(x, y)|. By the definition of Kˆ, it is in the
sub-gradient of Φ at
PˆX,Y (x,y)
PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
, and it is in [α, 1/α] due to (25). Since Φ being cL-Lipschitz in such
interval, we have
|Kˆ(x, y)| ≤ cL. (26)
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We are ready to prove (24).
∑
x,y:PX(x)PY (y)6=0
PX(x)PY (y)
∣∣∣∣∣ PX,Y (x, y)PX(x)PY (y) − PˆX,Y (x, y)PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
∣∣∣∣∣ |Kˆ(x, y)|
≤
∑
x,y:PX(x)PY (y)6=0
PX(x)PY (y)
∣∣∣∣∣ PX,Y (x, y)PX(x)PY (y) − PˆX,Y (x, y)PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
∣∣∣∣∣ cL (by (26))
=cL
∑ 1
PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
∣∣∣PX,Y (x, y)PˆX(x)PˆY (y)− PˆX,Y (x, y)PX(x)PY (y)∣∣∣
≤α2cL
∑∣∣∣PX,Y (x, y)PˆX(x)PˆY (y)− PˆX,Y (x, y)PX(x)PY (y)∣∣∣ (PˆX , PˆY ≥ α)
≤α2cL
∑
PX,Y
∣∣∣PˆX PˆY − PXPY ∣∣∣+ PXPY ∣∣∣PX,Y − PˆX,Y ∣∣∣
≤α2cL
∑∣∣∣PˆX PˆY − PXPY ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣PX,Y − PˆX,Y ∣∣∣ ≤ 3α2cLδ.
Now let’s prove (23). Because Φ is cL-Lipschitz in [α, 1/α], by (25), we have∣∣∣∣∣Φ
(
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
− Φ
(
PˆX,Y (x, y)
PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ cL
∣∣∣∣∣ PX,Y (x, y)PX(x)PY (y) − PˆX,Y (x, y)PˆX(x)PˆY (y)
∣∣∣∣∣ . (27)
With argument similar to the proof of (24), we completes the proof.
D.2 Proofs in Sect. 7.2
Proof of Lemma 7.5. Because K˜ satisfies Eqn. (12) and K? ∈ K, we have∫
K˜dP˜X,Y −
∫
Φ∗(K˜)dP˜X P˜Y ≥
∫
K?dP˜X,Y −
∫
Φ∗(K?)dP˜X P˜Y .
On the other hand,
BΦ∗,PXPY (K˜,K
?) =
∫
Φ∗(K˜)− Φ∗(K?)dPXPY −
∫ (
K˜ −K?
)
dPX,Y .
Combining these two we have an upper bound for BΦ∗,PXPY (K˜,K
?),∫ (
Φ∗(K˜)− Φ∗(K?)
)(
dPXPY − dP˜X P˜Y
)
−
∫ (
K˜ −K?
)(
dPX,Y − dP˜X,Y
)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 7.4. By Lemma 7.1 and 7.5, we know the error between DΦ(PX,Y ‖PXPY ) −
uA(τ , P,K) can be upper bound by
sup
k∈K
∣∣∣∣∫ Φ∗(k)− Φ∗(K?)d(P˜X P˜Y − PXPY )∣∣∣∣ (28)
sup
k∈K
∣∣∣∣∫ k −K?d(P˜X,Y − PX,Y )∣∣∣∣ . (29)
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Now we can apply the uniform bound in Theorem A.6 for (29). By taking A = εL1
R21
, B = 1, L = L1,
R = R1, and  = ε
√
n, we have
Pr
[
sup
k∈K
|vn(k)| ≥ 
]
= Pr
[
sup
k∈K
∣∣∣∣√n ∫ kd(Pˆn − P )∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε√n]
= Pr
[
sup
k∈K
∣∣∣∣∫ kd(Pˆn − P )∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε]
≤ B exp
(
− 
2
B2(A+ 1)R21
)
≤ exp
(
− ε
2
(A+ 1)R21
n
)
≤ 1
n2
δ.
The last inequality is true by taking n = mL/3 = O
(
(A+1)R21
ε2
log n
2
δ
)
= O
(
1
ε2
log n
2
δ
)
when ε is
small enough. We can derive similar upper bound for (29), and we complete the proof
D.3 Proof of Theorem 7.6
Proof. Let’s consider the following prior distribution PX,Y : Given non-negative variables α, β, γ
such that α+ β + γ ≤ 1, we set the distribution over X × Y = {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3} to be
PX,Y =
1
3
1− α− β α βα 1− α− γ γ
β γ 1− β − γ

An empirical distribution (histogram) from x1, . . . , xm can be represented by 9 integers m = (mk,l)
where k and l are between 1 to 3 and mk,l is the number of (k, l) in those m samples, and the
distribution of m forms a multi-nomial distribution. Therefore we can compute the expectation of
Dˆ,
E[Dˆ(x,y)]
=
∑
m:
∑
mk,l=m
m!∏
k,lmk,l!
∏
k,l
PX,Y (k, l)
mk,lDˆ(m)
=
∑
m:
∑
mk,l=m
m!∏
k,lmk,l!
(α
3
)m1,2+m2,1 (β
3
)m1,3+m3,1 (γ
3
)m2,3+m3,2
·
(
1− α+ β
3
)m1,1 (
1− β − γ
3
)m2,2 (
1− α+ γ
3
)m3,3
Dˆ(m)
which is a polynomial of α, β and γ. On the other hand, the Φ-divergence is
1
9
[2Φ (3α) + 2Φ (3β) + 2Φ (3γ) + Φ (3(1− α− β)) + Φ (3(1− β − γ)) + Φ (3(1− α− γ))]
By taking partial derivative with respect to α then β,
∂2
∂β∂α
E[Dˆ(x1, x2, . . . , xm)] =
∂2
∂β∂α
E
PXPY
[
Φ
(
PX,Y
PXPY
)]
= Φ′′(3(1− α− β))
which implies the second derivative of Φ is a polynomial on (0, 3) and Φ(a) is a polynomial on
(0, 3).
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Similarly we take another prior distribution
P ′X,Y =
1− α− β 0 00 α 0
0 0 β

and the Φ-divergence is
α2Φ(1/α) + b2Φ(1/β) + (1− α− β)2Φ(1/(1− α− β)) + (1− α2 − β2 − (1− α− β)2)Φ(0)
By taking partial derivative with respect to α and β we have
2Φ
(
1
x
)
− 2
x
Φ′
(
1
x
)
+
1
x2
Φ′′
(
1
x
)
is a polynomial with respect to x.
Combining these two statements we have if there are unbiased estimators for PX,Y and P
′
X,Y ,
the convex function Φ is a degree one polynomial which reaches a contradiction.
E Relation to CA mechanism and mutual information mechanism
E.1 CA mechanism
In the following proposition we show CA mechanism is a special case of our mechanism 1.
Proposition E.1 (CA mechanism [28]). If we take Φ(a) = 12 |a− 1| and restrict |K| ≤ 1/2, Then
the above mechanism reduces to the Correlated Agreement mechanism.
However the corresponding Φ is not strictly convex, so the mechanism is not strongly truthful
in general.
Proof. If we take Φ(a) = 12 |a− 1|, Φ∗(b) = b when |b| ≤ 1/2, the payment can be simplified as
MA(r) = K (xˆb, yˆb)− Φ∗ (K (xˆp, yˆq)) = K (xˆb, yˆb)−K (xˆp, yˆq) .
Moreover, by Table 1, Eqn. (2) reduces to
∂Φ
(
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
=

1/2 if PX,Y (x, y) > PX(x)PY (y);
−1/2 if PX,Y (x, y) < PX(x)PY (y);
[−1/2, 1/2] otherwise,
and the scoring functions are in ∂Φ
(
PX,Y (x,y)
PX(x)PY (y)
)
+ 12 .
E.2 Mutual Information Mechanism
The framework of mutual information mechanism [15] defines the payments to Alice (and Bob) to
be the Φ-mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s reports
DΦ(θ ◦ PX,Y ‖θ ◦ PXPY )
where P is the joint distribution of signal and θ is the strategy profile.
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Our mechanism can be seen as a special case of the mutual information mechanism when the
number of tasks goes to infinity. Formally, the fantasy mapping FΦ pays Alice and Bob with the
Φ-mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s reports. As the number of tasks goes to infinity,
both Algorithm 3 or 4 are (0, 0)-accurate and by the proof of Theorem 6.1, our mechanism with
learning Algorithm 3 or 4 pays Alice with FΦA which is the Φ-mutual information between Alice’s
and Bob’s reports.
However, our mechanism has a stronger guarantee when the number of tasks is finite. In the
proof of Theorem 6.1, our mechanism ensure Alice’s ex-ante payment is upper bounded by the
Φ-mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s reports uniformly under any strategy profiles.
This property does not hold if we estimate the Φ-mutual information directly without variational
representation.
For example, in Kong and Schoenebeck [15], they use the agents’ report profile to estimate the
density function and estimate the Φ-mutual information between their reports directly. In contrast,
although Mechanism 2 with learning Algorithm 3 also first estimates the density function, the
mechanism then computes a scoring function instead. These two methods have similar behavior
under the truth-telling strategy profile. However, given a fixed the number of tasks, there may exist
a non-truthful strategy profile θ such that we cannot estimate the density function θ◦P accurately.
The method in Kong and Schoenebeck [15] cannot provide a guarantee in such a situation. On the
other hand, our variational method ensures the ex-ante payments to agents under θ are worse than
the mutual information between agents’ reports. Having a uniform upper bound for a non-truthful
strategy is important for real application. We may assume our learning algorithm can estimate
agents’ signal distributions, which is derived from non-adversarial settings. However, agents adopt
the worst possible strategy profiles to break our mechanism adversarially.
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